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Nicol v World Travel and Tourism Council [2024] EAT 42

Mr Nicol had raised concerns to HR consultants about his CEO’s managerial style . The CEO was informed that concerns had been raised about her but was not told about their substance. Shortly afterwards, Mr Nicol was dismissed. Mr Nicol lost his s.103A dismissal claim because the ET found that the decision-maker—the CEO—had not been aware of the substance of the protected disclosure.

Mr Nicol appealed on the grounds that as long as a protected disclosure had been made to his employer (the HR consultants), and the decision-maker (the CEO) knew that a disclosure had been made, then the decision-maker did not need to know the substance of the disclosure to be liable for the retaliation.

On appeal, the EAT upheld the ET’s decision. It held that employers must have at least some knowledge about the substance of the disclosure to be liable for unfair dismissal arising from it. Mere awareness that a concern had been raised is not sufficient to establish causation.

Protect’s Comment: Proving that whistleblowing is the principal reason for a dismissal is an uphill battle for claimants. The first obstacle can indeed be knowledge: some employers will try to avoid liability by claiming or keeping themselves in ignorance of the substance of the disclosure. Though the EAT asserts in its judgement that the case of Jhuti  should provide adequate safeguards against such a scenario, as Tribunals were directed to “penetrate through the invention” of feigned or deliberate ignorance, this may be circumvented.s. For instance, it is easy to imagine a scenario where a decision-maker dismisses a whistleblower without knowing about or caring for the substance of their disclosure.

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